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KAREN L. CORR1E*
In 2011, the International Criminal Court (ICC) made significant advancements to-
wards becoming a more effective and responsive penal institution. This article describes
four noteworthy developments: (i) the UN Security Council's referral of the situation in
Libya to the ICC in February; (ii) the conclusion of the first trial in August; (iii) the
completion of three confirmation of charges hearings from September to October; and
(iv) the election of a new ICC Prosecutor in December.
I. The Situation in Libya
In February 2011, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1970, which, inter alia,
referred to the ICCI the conflict in Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, concerning the use of lethal
force against anti-government protesters by the regime of Muamma'r Gaddafi.2 This was
the Security Council's first unanimous referral of a situation to the ICC, and the United
States was among the referral's co-sponsors. Ambassador Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent
Representative to the United Nations, stated after the passage of Resolution 1970 that
"[t]he United States and all the members of the Council felt that what is transpiring is
absolutely unacceptable and demanded an urgent and unanimous response." 3 This was
also the first time the Security Council referred a situation to the ICC in the early stages
of an ongoing conflict and as part of a Resolution containing a comprehensive plan to try
to end it. Besides the ICC referral, Resolution 1970 included an arms embargo and other
arms restrictions, targeted sanctions on key regime figures such as travel bans and asset
* Associate Trial Lawyer, Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), the International Criminal Court. The views
expressed herein belong to the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of the OTP, the ICC, or
any other organization with which the author is, or has been, associated. Author can be contacted at karen
corrie@hotmail.com. For developments in international criminal law during 2010, see Donald E. Shaver,
International Criminal Law, 45 Irr'L LAW. 141 (2011). For developments during 2009, see Donald Shaver &
Michael C. Pacella, International Criminal Law, 44 INT'L LAW. 143 (2010).
1. Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court permits the UN Security Coun-
cil to refer a case to the ICC concerning crimes that occur anywhere in the world, committed by citizens of
any state. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 13(b), opened for signature July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
2. S.C. Res. 1970, 1 4, U.N. Doc S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011).
3. Susan E. Rice, Remarks at the Security Council Stakeout on Resolution 1970, Libya Sanctions (Feb. 26,
2011), available at http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/2011/157195.htm.
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freezing, and provisions for humanitarian assistance. 4 The Resolution was intended to
impose "immediate measures to stop the violence, ensure accountability and facilitate hu-
manitarian aid."5
In May 2011, about eleven weeks after the referral, the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP)
publicly filed applications for warrants of arrest for Gaddafi, his son Saif Al Islam Gaddafi,
and Head of Intelligence Abdullah AI-Senussi, for crimes against humanity.6 This is the
shortest time in which the OTP has requested an arrest warrant following the initiation of
an investigation. Pre-Trial Chamber I (PTC I) publicly issued the requested arrest war-
rants in June 2011. 7 Following the death of Muammar Gaddafi in October, Libyan Na-
tional Transitional Council (NTC) allies captured both Saif and AI-Senussi in late
November.8 Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo indicated his intent to allow NTC authorities
to try them, and to cooperate with the domestic prosecutions. 9
The referral of the situation in Libya is particularly remarkable in comparison with the
Security Council's only previous one-the March 2005 referral of the situation in Darfur,
Sudan.' 0 While the Libya referral came in the heat of the beginning of the conflict, the
Darfur referral came after the conflict in Darfur had raged for at least two years," nearly
one year after then Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency
Relief Coordinator Jan Egeland described the conflict to the Security Council as an "eth-
nic cleansing,"1 2 and only after the UN International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur
"strongly recommend[ed]" in late January 2005 that the Security Council refer the situa-
tion to the ICC.'3 Moreover, despite the monstrous nature of the crimes occurring in
Darfur, the referral was not unanimous. Four states abstained from the vote,14 including
the United States, which "fundamentally object[ed] to the view that the Court should be
4. S.C. Res. 1970, supra note 2, 9-26; Fact Sheet: U.N. Security Council Resolution 1970, Libya Sanctions,
U.S. MISSION TO THE UIrrTED NATIONS (Feb. 26, 2011), http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/201 1/
157194.htm [hereinafter Fact Sheet: Libya Sanctions].
5. Fact Sheet: Libya Sanctions, supra note 4.
6. Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi & Abdulla AI-Senussi, Case No. ICC-01/1 1-01/11, Prosecutor's
Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to Muamnar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi
and Abdullah AI-Senussi, I I (May 16, 2011), http.J/www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1073503.pdf.
7. Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/1 1-01/11, Decision on the Prosecutor's Application Pursuant to Article 58
as to Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, SaifAl-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah AI-Senussi, 11 95, 99,
102 (June 27, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.intliccdocs/doc/doc1099314.pdf.
8. See, e.g., Gaddaf!'s fugitive former spy chief arrested, AL JAZEERA (Nov. 21, 2011, 8:06 AM), http://
www.aljazeera.com/news/afiica/2011/11/20111120155942824390.html; Gaddafi's son Saifal-Islam captured in
Libya, BBC NEws (Nov. 19, 2011, 3:46 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15804299.
9. See Francois Murphy, ICC prosecutor happy for Libya to try Gaddafi son, RETrTERS (Nov. 23, 2011, 5:16
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/23/us-libya-ice-saif-idUSTRE7AM1 3H20111123.
10. S.C. Res. 1593, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).
11. The UN Responds to the Crisis in Darfur, UN.oRG, http://www.un.org/News/dh/dev/scripts/dar-
furjormatted.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2012).
12. Press Release, United Nations, Press Briefing on Humanitarian Crisis in Darfur, Sudan (Apr. 2, 2004),
http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2004/egelandbrf.DOC.htm.
13. Int'l Comm'n of Inquiry on Dafur, Report to the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council Res-
olution 1564 (2004), pp. 145-49, U.N. Doc. S/2005/60, (an. 25, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/News/
dh/sudan/comjinqdarfur.pdf.
14. These are Algeria, Brazil, China, and the United States. Press Release, Security Council, Security
Council Refers Situation in Darfur, Sudan, to Prosecutor of International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. SC/
8351 (Mar. 31, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sc835I.doc.htm.
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able to exercise jurisdiction over the nationals, including government officials, of States
not party to the Rome Statute." 15
Against this backdrop, the Libya referral shows a marked shift in the international com-
munity's regard for the ICC. It shows that the members of the Security Council, even
those who have not ratified the Statute, view the ICC as a legitimate and valuable institu-
tion that can contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. It also
shows that the Court has been incorporated into the international community's arsenal for
prevention of, and immediate response to, human rights atrocities.
II. Conclusion of the First Trial
On August 25-26, 2011, Trial Chamber I heard closing statements in the case Prosecutor
v. Thomas Lubanga Dyio. Lubanga is accused of having committed, as a co-perpetrator,
war crimes of enlisting and conscripting children under the age of fifteen years into the
Forces patriotiques pour la liberation du Congo (FPLC), and using them to participate
actively in hostilities in Ituri, a district of the eastern province of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo (DRC), between September 2002 and August 2003.16
Since the trial began on January 26, 2009, sixty-two witness have been called in the
Lubanga trial: thirty-six by the Prosecution; nineteen by the Defense; three by the legal
representatives of victims; and four by the Trial Chamber.17 This case has seen a number
of firsts at the ICC, including: the first surrender of a suspect to the ICC; the first hearing
on confirmation of charges; the first trial; and the first completion of a trial. With these
firsts, it has taken practical steps that clarify how civil and common law judicial traditions
merge in the ICC's hybrid system of criminal procedure. It also served as the test case for
numerous legal and procedural matters, such as the criteria for allowing, and the modali-
ties of, victims' participation. Is
The case was not without difficulties. For example, Trial Chamber I stayed the pro-
ceedings for approximately five months after it concluded in June 2008 that the Prosecu-
tion had not disclosed to the Defense over 200 documents which contained potentially
exculpatory information or which were material to the Defense's preparation, based on an
incorrect use of article 54(3)(e) of the Rome Statute. 19 In another example, the Prosecu-
15. Id.
16. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Amended Document Containing
the Charges, Article 61(3)(a), passim (Dec. 23, 2008), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc613661.PDF.
17. Press Release, Int'l Criminal Court, Trial Chamber I to deliberate on the case against Thomas Lubanga
Dyilo, ICC-CPI-20110826-PR714 (Aug. 26, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres/F6852F83-165D-
4D4C-8345-248899A589BC.htn.
18. See Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment on the appeals of The Prosecutor and The De-
fense against Trial Chamber I's Decision on Victims' Participation of 18 January 2008, 1105 (July 11, 2008),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc529076.PDF.
19. Article 54(3)(e) allows the Prosecutor, exceptionally, to receive information or documents on the condi-
tion of confidentiality, which are not for use at trial but solely for the purpose of generating new evidence.
Following a decision by the Appeals Chamber that article 54(3)(e) does not supersede the Prosecutor's ongo-
ing obligation under article 67(2) to disclose exculpatory evidence to the Defense, the information providers
lifted the article 54(3)(e) restrictions on the documents, which eventually led Trial Chamber I to lift the stay
in November 2008 because its basis had "fallen away." Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment on
the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Trial Chamber I entitled "Decision on the consequences
of non-disclosure of exculpatory materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and the application to stay
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tion's first trial witness initially retracted his claim that he had served as a child soldier in
the FPLC and said that an unnamed NGO told him what to say.20
Despite such obstacles, the conclusion of the first ICC trial is a momentous occasion
demonstrating that the Court is fully capable of adjudicating international criminal
charges. Moreover, the case has had a positive impact on the prevention of the use of
child soldiers, and has raised awareness of the impact of such crimes on children. For
example, it contributed to the demobilization of thousands of child soldiers in Nepal. 21 As
this article went to press, Judges Sir Adrian Fulford (presiding), Elizabeth Odio Benito,
and Ren6 Blattmann had retired to deliberate, and shall issue a decision "within a reasona-
ble period of time[.]" 22
1H. Confirmation Hearigs
Further proof of the ICC's increased efficiency can be found in the three confirmation
of charges hearings23 held from September to October 2011. Prior to 2011, only five
confirmation hearings were ever held at the ICC, and none were ever held back-to-back;
at most, only two confirmation hearings have previously been held in one year, separated
by nine months.24
The first hearing was held September 1-8, in the case Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto,
Henry KGprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang. This is one of the two cases arising from the
the prosecution of the a accused, together with certain other issues raised at the Status Conference on 10 June
2008," 48 (Oct. 21, 2008), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc578371.pdf; Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/
04-01/06, Status Conference Transcript, pp. 1-4 (Nov. 18, 2008) http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/
doc586028.pdf; Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Reasons for Oral Decision lifting the stay of proceed-
ings, passim (Jan. 23, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc622878.pdf.
20. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Trial Transcript, pp. 27-36, 39-41 (Jan. 28, 2009), http://
www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc976333.pdf; see also Lubanga Trial First victim testifies, then recants; outreach to
DRC; Defense concerns, COALITION FOR THE INT'L CRIu1. CT (Jan. 29, 2009), http://www.iccnow.org/
?mod=newsdetail&news=3240. This recantation led Trial Chamber I to initially declare the wimess unable to
continue his testimony because he was not in an "appropriate state," and Deputy Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda
to request that the Court open an investigation into possible threats made against its second wiimess, a family
member of the first. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Trial Transcript, pp. 16-22 (an. 29, 2009), http://
www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc624658.pdf.
21. Film Follows First Trials of International Criminal Court's Chief Prosecutor, PBS NEWSHOUR (Oct. 6,
2011), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/world/july-decl 1/efp_10-06.html; Mac McClelland, To Catch a War-
lord, MOTHER JONES, Sept.-Oct. 2011, available at http://motherjones.com/politics/2011/09/bosco-nta-
ganda-congo-warlord. Other factors include, for example, the Special Court for Sierra Leone's conviction of
three Sierra Leonean military leaders for conscripting child soldiers. See, e.g., Lisa Clifford, ICC Examines
Child Soldier Convictions: Sierra Leonean court's precedent-setting verdicts likely to influence ICC cases in Uganda and
DRC, INSTru-TE FOR WAR & PEACE REPORTING (June 25, 2007), http://iwpr.net/report-news/icc-exam-
ines-child-soldier-convictions.
22. Int'l Criminal Court Rules of Procedure & Evidence, Rule 142(1), ICC-ASP/l/3, Part II-A (Sept. 9,
2002), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Legal+Texts+and+Tools/Official+Joumal/
Rules+of+Procedure+and+Evidence.htm.
23. At the confirmation of charges hearing, the Pre-Trial Chamber "determine[s] whether there is suffi-
cient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that the" suspect committed the crimes charged.
Where it finds that the evidence is sufficient, it shall confirm those charges and commit the suspect to a Trial
Chamber for trial. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 61(7).
24. These are the confirmation hearings in Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/
05-01/08 (held in January 2009) and Prosecutor v. Bahar ldriss Abu Garda, Case No. ICC-02/05-02/09 (held
in Oct. 2009).
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Prosecution's proprio motu investigation into the violence following the 2007 Presidential
election in Kenya.25 It was the first case in which the suspects called witnesses to testify
for them at the confirmation hearing: suspects William Samoei Ruto2 6 and Joshua Arap
Sang27 each called two witnesses, in addition to giving unsworn statements themselves.
28
A decision in this case is expected in January 2012.29
The second hearing was held September 16-21, in the case Prosecutor v. Callixte
Mbarusbimana. This case arose from the Prosecution's ongoing investigations into crimes
committed in the DRC. 30 It concerns crimes committed by the Forces Dmocratiques
pour la Liberation du Rwanda - Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi (FDLR) targeting the
civilian population of the Kivus, an area on the DRC's eastern border.3' PTC I
rendered its decision on the confirmation of charges on December 16: by majority, the
Chamber held that there was not sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to
believe that Mbarushimana was criminally responsible for the crimes charged, and
ordered his release. 32 All OTP attempts to prevent Mbarushimana's release were
25. The second is the case Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Moham-
med Hussein Ali, discussed below.
26. Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey & Joshua Arap Sang, Case No. ICC-01/
09-01/11, Confirmation Hearing Transcript, passim (Sept. 3, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/
doc1230659.pdf (Sept. 3, 2011).
27. See Ruto, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/1 1, Confirmation Hearing Transcript, pp. 48-89 (Sept. 6, 2011),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1232783.pdf; Ruto, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Confirmation Hear-
ing Transcript, pp. 4-91 (Sept. 7, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1232354.pdf.
28. See Ruto, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/1 1, Confirmation Hearing Transcript, pp. 95-99, 112-16 (Sept. 1,
2011), http://www.icc-cpi.intliccdocs/doc/docl232354.pdf.
29. Typically, pursuant to Regulation 53 of the Regulations of the Court, the Pre-Trial Chamber shall-
absent good cause to do otherwise-issue its decision on the confirmation hearing within sixty days from the
date on which the confirmation hearing ends. But in this case, the Chamber decided that, due to security
concerns, it will issue its decision in this case at the same time as it issues the decision in the Mutbaura case.
See Ruto, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/1 1, Decision on the Issuance of the Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7) of
the Rome Statute, passim (Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/docl253141.pdf. This is likely
to be in early 2012-sixty days after the submission of the final closing briefs in that case (Nov. 21, 2011). See
Prosecutor v. Muthaura, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/1 1, Confirmation Hearing Transcript, p. 88 (Oct. 5, 2011),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1249709.pdf.
30. See Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10, Prosecution's Application under
Article 58, pp. 55-56, (Aug. 20, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doclOO8311 .pdf.
31. See id. at 4.
32. See Mbarushimana, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10, decision on the confirmation of charges, pp. 129-49
(Dec. 16, 2011), http://212.159.242.180/iccdocs/doc/docl286409.pdf.
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rejected. 33 On December 27, the OTP filed an application for leave to appeal the
decision. 34
The third and final hearing was held from September 21 to October 5, in the case
Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Mutbaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali.
This is the second of the two cases arising from the Kenya investigation. It was the first
confirmation hearing at which a suspect, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, testified under oath;
Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo cross-examined him. 35 A decision in this case is also likely
to come in January 2012, at the same time as the Ruto decision. 36
The fact that the ICC could hold three confirmation hearings, one immediately after
the other, demonstrates the ICC's increasingly efficient case management. Efficiency is a
key component of the ICC's success as an international penal institution that can respond
to crimes in a timely manner and successfully deter prospective criminals.
These confirmation hearings, however, also highlight the ICC's resource needs. For
example, the hearings were held at the same time as ongoing trials, which required the
hearings and trials to share the ICC's two courtrooms, and as a result both could hold
sessions for only portions of the day. This prolonged the length of the confirmation hear-
ings, minimally delayed the trials, and, in the cases of Ruto and Mutbaura, led to members
of all ICC organs having to appear at or support the hearings after normal working hours
and on weekends.37 To keep up with its expanding and accelerating caseload, the ICC will
need to maintain a sufficient infrastructure, mindful of facilities and human resources.
33. The day the decision was issued, the OTP filed an application for a stay of Mbarushimana's release. See
Mbarusbimana, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10, Prosecution's request for stay of order to release Callixte
Mbarushimana, pp. 3-4 (Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc12 9 10 52.pdf PTC I denied
the request on December 19. See Mbanssbimana, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10, Decision on the Prosecution's
Request for stay of order to release Callixte Mbarushimana, p. 6, (Dec. 19, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/
iccdocs/doc/doc1291179.pdf. Also on December 19, the OTP appealed the confirmation decision pursuant
to Article 82(1)(b) of the Rome Statute. See Mbarushinana, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10, Prosecution's Ap-
peal against "Decision on the confirmation of charges" and Request for Suspensive Effect In the alternative,
Prosecution's Appeal against "Decision on the Prosecution's Request for stay of order to release Callixte
Mbarushimana," p. 3 (Dec. 19, 2011) http://www.icc-cpi.intliccdocs/doc/doc1291319.pdf. The Appeals
Chamber dismissed this appeal as inadmissible on December 20. See Mbarusbimana, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/10, Decision on the appeal of the Prosecutor of 19 December 2011 against the "Decision on the confirma-
tion of the charges" and, in the alternative, against the "Decision on the Prosecution's Request for stay of
order to release Callixte Mbarushimana" and on the victims' request for participation, p. 3, (Dec. 20, 2011),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/docl291760.pdf.
34. See Mbarusbimana, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10, Prosecution's Application for Leave to Appeal the
"Decision on the confirmation of charges," p. 3-18 (Dec. 27, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/
doc1293405.pdf.
35. See Mutbaura, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Confirmation Hearing Transcript, pp. 97-98 (Sept. 28,
2011), http://www.icc-epi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1237782.pdf; Mutbaura, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Confir-
mation Hearing Transcript, pp. 3-93 (Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1247738.pdf.
36. See Ruto, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/1l, Decision on the Issuance of the Decision Pursuant to Article
61(7) of the Rome Statute, passim (Oct. 26, 2011), http'./www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1253141.pdf.
37. In Ruto and Mutbaura, the confirmation hearings were held from 2:30 p.m. until 8:00 p.m. on most
weekdays and on Saturdays from 9:30 a.m. until sometime in the afternoon, while the trial in Prosecutor v.
Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, which shared the courtroom, sat only in the mornings until
the confirmation hearings were finished. See Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui,
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Conference Transcript, p. 1 (Dec. 14, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/
doc1288172.pdf. Similarly, the Mbarusbinana confirmation hearing was held from 9:00 a.m. until approxi-
mately 1:00 p.m., and the Bemba trial, which shared the courtroom, began its sessions in the afternoons.
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WV. Election of the New Prosecutor
In the context of these developments, a new Prosecutor has been elected to head the
OTP starting in July 2012: Ms. Fatou Bensouda (The Gambia), currently Deputy Prose-
cutor of the OTP, and formerly Senior Legal Adviser at the International Criminal Tribu-
nal for Rwanda (ICTR), and Attorney General and Minister of Justice of the Republic of
The Gambia. Ms. Bensouda was officially elected on December 12, 2011, at the tenth
session of the Assembly of States Parties (ASP).38
This election is important because the Prosecutor plays a crucial role at the ICC. The
Prosecutor is the de facto public face of the OTP, and steers the OTP, which is the
catalyst for all ICC cases. Thus, the. Prosecutor's experience in the field of international
criminal prosecutions, aptitude for international relations, and relationship to the media
influence the kind and volume of work that the rest of the Court will perform, and the
public's perception of it.
The ICC has had only one Prosecutor so far: Argentinean Luis Moreno-Ocampo.
While often a lightning rod for criticism, Moreno-Ocampo has successfully established a
well-functioning structure for the OTP, and pushed it to be efficient and proactive. This
has led to: the completion of one trial; two additional ongoing trials; 39 one case awaiting
the beginning of trial;40 two cases pending decision by the PTC on whether charges will
be confirmed and the cases sent to trial;41 the arrest of the first former head of state,
whose confirmation of charges hearing is scheduled for June 2012;42 eight outstanding
arrest warrants;4 3 seven ongoing investigations; 44 and over ten situations under analysis4s
38. Evelyn Kwamboka, Gambia's Bensouda is new ICC Prosecutor, THE STANDARD (Dec. 13, 2011), http://
www.standardmedia.co.ke/archives/news/InsidePage.php?id=2000048274&cid=4&; Patrick Worsnip, Gam-
bia's Bensouda is next international prosecutor, REUTERs AFRicA (Dec. 13, 2011, 6:49 AM), http://af.reuters.
com/article/topNews/idAFJOE7BCOOQ20111213.
39. Katanga & Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07; Bemba , Case No. ICC-01/05 -01/08.
40. See Case Information Sheet of Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain & Saleh Mohammed
Jerbo Jamus, Case No. ICC-02/05-03/09 (Sept. 14, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/
BandaAndJerboEng.pdf.
41. Ruto, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11; Mutbaura, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/1 1.
42. In the preliminary examination of the situation in C6te d'Ivoire, the OTP filed an application for a
warrant of arrest for former Ivorian president Laurent Gbagbo on October 25, 2011. PTC I issued the
arrest warrant on Nov. 23, 2011, finding that there were reasonable grounds to believe that Gbagbo was
responsible as an indirect co-perpetrator pursuant to Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute for widespread and
systematic attacks committed in the aftermath of the presidential elections in C6te d'Ivoire that targeted
civilians believed to support President Alassane Ouattara. See Prosecutor v. Laurent Koudou Gbagbo, Case
No. ICC-02/1 1-01/11, Warrant Of Arrest For Laurent Koudou Gbagbo, pp. 3-5 (Nov. 30, 2011), http://
www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/docl276751.pdf. On November 29, 2011, Ivorian authorities surrendered
Gbagbo to the ICC. See Press Release, Int'l Crim. Ct., New suspect in the ICC's custody: Laurent Gbagbo
arrived at the detention centre (Nov. 30, 2011), http://icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situ-
ations/icc02 l/related%20cases/iccO2 11011 l/press%20releases/pr747. At his initial appearance before the
Court on December 5, 2011, the Chamber scheduled the confirmation of charges hearing to begin on June
18, 2012. See Press Release, Int'l Crim. Ct., Confirmation of charges hearing in the case of The Prosecutor v.
Laurent Gbagbo scheduled to start on 18 June 2012 (Dec. 5, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres/
8CF19660-F74A-4E45-9168-48512639E6F4.htm (Dec. 5, 2011).
43. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo & Dominic Ongwen, ICC-02/04-
01/05-53 (uly 8, 2005), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc97185.PDF; Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda,
ICC-01/04-02/06-2 (Apr. 28, 2008), http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Situations/
Situation+ICC+0104/Related+Cases/ICC+0104+0206/; Prosecutor v. Ahmad Harun & Ali Kushayb, ICC-
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during Moreno-Ocampo's nine-year term. These accomplishments have also encouraged
state-level accountability procedures. For example, the threat of ICC investigation and
prosecutions encouraged the pursuit of national accountability mechanisms in Colombia46
and Guinea.47
The search for the next ICC Prosecutor was conducted by a Search Committee for the
Prosecutor of the ICC (Search Committee), composed of five members, one from each
regional group in the ASP.48 It drew up an initial list of fifty-two candidates who applied
or were recommended for the job, and interviewed eight of them before narrowing the
field down to a final four,49 whose names were released on October 25, 2011. In addition
to Ms. Bensouda, the other three candidates were:
* Andrew T. Cayley (United Kingdom), currently International Co-Prosecutor, Ex-
traordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), and formerly Senior Trial
Lawyer, ICC and Senior Prosecuting Counsel, ICTY;
* Mohamed Chande Othman (Tanzania), currently Chief Justice of Tanzania, and for-
merly Senior Legal and Justice Sector Reform Adviser, United Nations Development
Program, Cambodia and Chief of Prosecutions, ICTR; and
• Robert Petit (Canada), currently Counsel, Crimes Against Humanity and War
Crimes Section, Department of Justice, Canada, and formerly International Co-Pros-
ecutor of the ECCC and Senior Prosecuting Trial Attorney, Special Court for Sierra
Leone.50
02/05-01/07-2 and ICC-02/05-01/07-3 (Apr. 27, 2007), http://www.iclklamberg.com/Caselaw/Sudan/Haru-
nandKushayb/PTCI/ICC-02-05-0l-7-2-CorrEnglish.pdf; Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir,
ICC-02/05-01/09-95 (July 12, 2010), http'J/www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Siations/
Situation+ICC+0205/Related+Cases/ICC02050109/.
44. These investigations concern situations in Uganda, the DRC, the Central African Republic, the Sudan,
Kenya, Libya and C6te d'Ivoire. See Cases & Situations, COALMON FOR THE INT'L CRs1M.CT., http://ww.
iccnow.org/?mod=casessituations (last visited Jan. 23, 2012).
45. These are situations the Office of the Prosecutor is assessing to determine whether to open a formal
ICC investigation. The Office has made public its preliminary examination of sixteen situations, including
those that have led to the opening of investigations (Uganda, DRC, Central African Republic, Darfur, Kenya,
Libya, and C6te d'Ivoire), those dismissed (including Venezuela and Iraq), and those that remain under pre-
liminary examination (Colombia, Afghanistan, Georgia, Palestine, Guinea, Honduras, Korea, and Nigeria).
See Communications, Referrals and Preliminary Examinations, INT'L CIUaM. CT., http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/
ICC/Structure+of+the+CourtOffice+of+the+Prosecutor/Comm+and+Ref/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2012).
46. See William W. Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and National
Courts in the Rome System ofinternational Justice, 49 HARv. INT't L.J. 53, 89-90 (2008).
47. See Press Release, Human Rights Watch, One Year On, No Justice for Bloody Stadium Massacre (Sept.
26, 2010), http://allafrica.com/stories/20100927033l.htni.
48. These are the African Group, the Asian Group, the Eastern European Group, the Group of Latin
American and Caribbean States, and the Western European and Others Group. See Press Release, Int'l Crim.
Ct., Search Committee for the position of ICC Prosecutor takes up work (Feb. 8, 2011), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR1exeres/09944531-548B-467F-882D-06EF937899B.htm.
49. Report of the Search Committee For the Position of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal
Court, paras. 2, 27, 31 (Oct. 22, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp-docs/Elections/EP20II/EP2011-
PSC-Report-complete-ENG.pdf.
50. Id. These are only highlights of their former positions. For more information about the candidates, see
the Search Committee's Report,
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Experts called the group "a very strong shortlist,"15 and indeed all have experience pros-
ecuting crimes on an international stage. Ms. Bensouda brings the added benefit of her
experience as the ICC's Deputy Prosecutor; as she is already intimately familiar with the
OTP's practices and caseload, she can take the reins from Moreno-Ocampo with speed
and continuity, and likely already has plans for how to continue to build and improve the
office.
V. Conclusion
These developments demonstrate that the ICC is building the capacity and reputation
to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. It has an increasing
potential to fulfill the purposes of criminal prosecutions, particularly protection of the
public from further commission of crimes, appropriate punishment for crimes commit-
ted, 52 and deterrence of future crimes by other potential offenders. As the next Prosecu-
tor, Ms. Bensouda must build on this momentum, acting as the driving force for further
advancement.
51. Aaron Gray-Block, ICC deputy prosecutor on shortlistfor boss's job, REUTERS (Oct. 25, 2011, 5:56 PM),
http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE790OJ920111025?pageNumber-2&virtualBrandChannel=0
&spotrue;.
52. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, preamble (noting that the prevention of, and punishment for, the most
serious crimes of concern to the international community are among the purposes of the ICC).
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